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Introduction 
For centuries the patriarchal structure of Chinese society has been nearly absolute. The emphasis 
placed on filial piety, family structure, and proper gender roles in Chinese society is so strong 
that the character for “good” is hao 好. Individually, the character nu女 means “woman” and 
pictographically appears to be a pregnant woman. The character zi 子 represents a child and 
generally is associated with male children. Thus, hao好 pictographically defines “good” as a 
female who is pregnant with a male child. The importance of women bearing sons and the idea 
of male superiority has been essential in China and has permeated nearly all aspects of society. 
Historically, patriarchal societal norms were closely intertwined with government and politics 
and the pro-natalist and patriarchal norms were supported by religion, philosophy, and 
government policies. Traditional practices coexisted in harmony with state power. The rise of the 
Cultural Revolution and Mao Zedong altered this complementary relationship, and new policies 
that conflicted with cultural and societal norms and values were implemented. One of the most 
extreme examples of this new, conflicting relationship is China’s infamous One Child Policy. 
The One Child Policy has challenged traditional patriarchal, patrilineal, patrilateral, and 
patrilocal ideas and practices.  
The One Child Policy (OCP) is commonly criticized and denounced by scholars and 
activists alike, but the OCP had a positive impact on gender equality in China. In this paper I will 
demonstrate this positive impact. I will begin by discussing the background of the OCP and its 
implementation and scope. I will then discuss the current literature on the OCP, how current 
literature focuses nearly solely on human rights, and how human rights differ from gender 
equality. In the fourth section I will examine the OCP’s impact on family structure in China and 
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the evolving role of the singleton daughter. The changes in family dynamics and the benefits 
afforded to singleton daughters, I will argue in the next sections have resulted in increasing 
gender equality in China, as evidenced by educational attainment and outcomes, the workforce 
participation and forms of employment held, spousal dynamics in marriage, and roles and 
participation in religious practices.  
 
Background 
After World War II, the world experienced the fastest population growth rate in human history 
(Feng, Cai, and Gu 116). China was at the forefront of this dramatic increase. In 1949, China had 
541.7 million people, which was 22 percent of the world’s population (Attané 103). During the 
height of the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong heavily encouraged and rewarded high rates of 
reproduction, and women generally gave birth to five to six children (Y. Peng 771). During the 
prior century – marked by rebellions, epidemics, wars, and the collapse of the imperial 
government and its authority – the population growth rate in China was no more than 0.3 percent 
per year (Kane and Choi 992). Mao Zendeng saw an expansion in the populations as a sign of 
China’s new strength and was often quoted using the traditional Chinese saying “Of all things in 
the world, people are the most precious.” Beginning in 1953, Mao’s government contributed to 
the health of mothers and children and promoted high rates of reproduction. By 1970, the influx 
of reproduction combined with the falling death rates resulted in the population growth rate 
rising to 2.8%, which amounts to approximately 250 million additional people (992).     
Soon, extreme population growth in China became a potential threat to the nation’s food 
surplus, economic development, and the government’s ability to meet the needs of its people 
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(Settles, at al. 1; Kane and Choi 992). In the 1960s, China established the Birth Planning 
Commission to lead its efforts on birth control and population planning. But, population growth 
in the region continued to rapidly increase (Feng, Cai, and Gu 117). In 1970, the commission 
established target population growth rates, extended contraceptive and abortion services to rural 
areas, and promoted later marriages, longer intervals between birth, and smaller families. Within 
five years, China’s population growth rate fell to 1.8 percent, and the commission set a 
population growth rate of 1 percent as the target for 1980 and a 0 percent growth rate as the 
target for 2000. It was determined by Chinese statisticians that these goals were unachievable 
through a “later, longer, fewer” campaign since more than half of the current population was 
under the age of 21, which was the product of the government’s former promotion of high rates 
of reproduction (Kane and Choi 992). In 1979, as a solution to extreme population growth, the 
policy of Jihua shengyu zhengce 计划生育政策 or “family planning policy” began to be 
implemented. This policy has become popularly known in Western culture as the One Child 
Policy. By 1982, birth control was announced as “basic state policy” (Feng, Cai, and Gu 118). 
 “The State advocates the [sic] one couple has only one child. Except for special cases, 
with approval for second birth, government officials, workers and urban residents can 
have only one child for each couple. In rural areas, the State also advocates that each 
couple has only one child. However, with approval, those who have real difficulties can 
have their second child, several years after the birth of the first. “ – announcement by the 
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and the State Council’s Resolution 
Concerning the Strengthening of Birth Control and Strictly Controlling Population 
Growth, 1980. (Settles, et al. 2).  
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The tenants of the OCP were fairly straightforward. Parents were to only have one child. This 
was encouraged through a package of financial and other incentives, such as access to health 
services, schooling, and housing for themselves and for their single child. The government also 
discouraged larger families through heavy financial levies on additional children, lack of access 
to government-sponsored employment for those with multiple children, and developing the 
social norm those families must sacrifice having multiple children for the survival of future 
generations. The specifics of these measures varied from province to province (Kane and Choi 
992).  
The OCP policy was extremely successful. Population growth slowed from 11.6 percent 
in 1979 to 5.9 percent in 2005, which reduced the population by an estimated 250-300 million 
(Settles, et al. 5). Implementation was especially effective in urban areas where officials could 
closely monitor the population. By the late 1990s, in urban areas such as Beijing, Shanghai, and 
Nanjing, 95 percent of preschool-aged children were reported to be only children (5). 
Implementation of the OCP has proven more challenging in rural areas where populations were 
more difficult to monitor and there were more religious-based objections as well as a perceived 
need to have sons to perform farm labor. Despite these obstacles, within nearly every village in 
rural China a government official with the title of “Women’s Head” works to enforce the OCP 
(Judd 215). Chart 1 depicts the drastic decline in fertility rates. 
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Chart 1  
 
(Poston, modified)  
As the policy developed, exemptions and exceptions became increasingly prominent. 
Ethnic minorities, defined as non-Han Chinese groups, were excluded from the policy (Kane and 
Choi 992). In many rural areas, if a couple’s first child is female, they may have one more child 
to try again for a son. This concession was stated by the government to be based on the fact that 
sons are more useful to an agriculturally-based family, but it also represents a slight concession 
to tradition by the government after immense challenges to the policy from rural populations (Li 
and Cooney 292). Parents can also have additional children if they are willing and able to pay 
additional, heavy taxes or if their first child is severely disabled. More recently, an exception has 
been released stating that if both the husband and the wife are only children, then they can have 
two children (Short and Zhai 376-377). Even with these exceptions, the population growth rate in 
China has continued to decrease and one-child families continue to be the norm.  
This means that the average family structure in China has rapidly shifted from primarily 
multi-children families to families that consist of four grandparents, two parents, and one child. 
This drastic change in family structure begs the question, what happens to daughters who are 
being reared as a single child? 
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Distinguishing Human Rights and Gender Equality 
Since the implementation of the One Child Policy, there has been substantial research on its 
gendered effects; however, there is a gap in the literature. Specifically, though studies often 
examine gender, they do so from a human rights perspective, which does not directly address 
gender equality. Research overwhelmingly demonstrates that the OCP has produced massive 
human rights violations such as female abandonment and lethal neglect, female infanticide, 
forced abortions, forced sterilization, and gender-selective abortions. There are also less apparent 
violations such as the limitation of personal reproductive autonomy. However, all of these issues 
– despite how egregious they are – are human rights issues and do not thoroughly examine all 
facets of gender equality. Some may argue that the human rights violations and concerns 
specifically target gender, and I agree, but there are more gendered impacts of the OCP that 
should be examined and I will do so purely through a lens of gender equality. Before I delve into 
an examination of the OCP through this lens, I will clarify the difference between human rights 
and gender equality to explain how these approaches are unique.  While guaranteeing equal 
rights for women may fall under the purview of human rights, gender equality itself is a different 
concept. 
I will not argue the theory or philosophy behind human rights or from where human 
rights gain their status. I will instead use the primary, internationally agreed upon politically 
constructed definition of human rights as declared by the United Nations Office of the 
Commissioner for Human Rights. The summarization of this codified definition is as follows: 
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“Human rights are rights inherent to all human beings, whatever our nationality, place of 
residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, language, or any other status. 
We are all equally entitled to our human rights without discrimination. These rights are 
all interrelated, interdependent and indivisible. Universal human rights are often 
expressed and guaranteed by law, in the forms of treaties, customary international law, 
general principles and other sources of international law. International human rights law 
lays down obligations of Governments to act in certain ways or to refrain from certain 
acts, in order to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
individuals or groups.” 
Continuing with United Nations definitions for consistency, the Entity for the Gender Equality 
and the Empowerment of Women offers a clear, simple explanation of gender equality.  
 “[Gender equality] refers to the equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities of women 
and men and girls and boys. Equality does not mean that women and men will become 
the same but that women’s and men’s rights, responsibilities and opportunities will not 
depend on whether they are born male or female. Gender equality implies that the 
interests, needs and priorities of both women and men are taken into consideration, 
recognizing the diversity of different groups of women and men. Gender equality is not a 
women’s issue but should concern and fully engage men as well as women. Equality 
between women and men is seen both as a human rights issue and as a precondition for, 
and indicator of, sustainable people-centered development. “  
In short, human rights are rights that are possessed by humans while gender equality is a 
measure of not only equal access to and application of those rights for both genders but also 
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equal responsibilities and opportunities and equal concern for the needs of both genders. Gender 
equality is often confused as a subset of human rights, but this is not correct. Gender equality is 
an indicator of gender stratification. This makes gender equality an indicator of a just or an 
unjust application of human rights. As stated above, gender equality may be viewed as a human 
rights issue, but it is a different concept. For instance, when there is gender-based subjugation 
and women are not afforded the same opportunities as men, then this may be a violation of the 
human rights of the women. However, gender equality is a measurement of the representation of 
men and women in a particular context. Women can call upon their human rights to justify a 
need for gender equality, but gender equality itself is not a human right. For example, if a woman 
is forced to marry a man against her will by being sold into a marriage through a contractual 
agreement between the males in her family and her spouse, this violates the woman’s marriage 
rights as enumerated in Article 16.2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states 
“Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.” 
Article 2 of the Declaration states that “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set 
forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” So, 
the woman’s human right to enter marriage only if she freely consents has been violated. Also, 
using the lens of gender equality critique we can see that since her spouse freely consented and 
she was not able to, the rights have not only not been applied in the way that both persons are 
entitled to, but also there is gender stratification. This is compounded by the fact that it was an 
agreement between her male spouse and the males in her family. Gender equality measures are 
tools that show how human rights are being applied and if they are being done so in a balanced 
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manner. There is a guarantee for all humans to be entitled to their human rights, but there is no 
human right to gender equality. 
Research that has been done on the OCP in relation to gender has been focused on human 
rights, particularly women who desire additional children, women seeking to give birth to a son 
instead of a daughter, and the plight of unwanted female fetuses and infants (Fong 1101). And, in 
that research it has been clearly demonstrated that many of the human rights violations are 
gender-based. This does affect the assessment of gender equality in China under the OCP; 
however, there is a lack of research on all aspects of gender equality. Current research focuses 
almost entirely on reproductive issues such as lack of autonomy, selective abortions, forced 
abortions, female infanticide, and female abandonment. Because current research on the OCP 
and gender has examined primarily violations of human rights, areas in which human rights have 
not been violated have not been thoroughly examined. This emphasis on human rights violations 
with regards to reproductive issues begs the question: What happens to female children who are 
kept and raised as only children? Those are the facets of gender equality that I will discuss in my 
assessment.  
Currently, some research does exist that examines an individual indicator of gender 
equality and how the OCP has affected that indicator. Papers about the OCP and labor, the OCP 
and education of daughters, and the OCP and religion have been published. But the literature is 
limited and lacking. My research will contribute to current scholarship by providing a synthesis 
of many recognized indicators of gender equality and their relationship with the OCP. Current 
literature also either focuses on a singular adult experience such as marriage or labor or on a 
singular childhood experience such as early education or the parent-child relationship. In this 
paper, I will analyze how childhood experiences within the family translate into adult 
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experiences. This will track the development of singleton daughters and how the OCP has 
impacted their lives. Through this, I will demonstrate the positive effect the OCP has had on 
gender equality in China.  
Gender equality can be evaluated by examining gender stratification in society. The term 
“gender stratification” is used to discuss inequality between the genders in education, 
employment, and the family and other social institutions (Veeck, Flumy, and Jiang 87). I will 
discuss each of these components in China in relation to the OCP in the coming sections. First, I 
will examine Chinese family dynamics and how the family structure has been altered when there 
is a singleton daughter. I will then show how the changing attitude of the Chinese family to the 
singleton daughter has positively impacted the daughter’s education. In the next section I will 
discuss the changing role of the empowered Chinese woman in the workforce. I will then discuss 
the growing equality of marriage dynamics in China.  Finally, to examine religion, I will 
examine the changing role of women in traditional Chinese ancestor worship. 
 
The Changing Family Structure and the Singleton Daughter 
Since the emergence of Confucius teachings in the 6th century BC, China has solidified a social 
structure based on filial piety and patriarchy. This structure intersected with pre-existing and 
emerging traditions, but the base structure remained the same highly patriarchal and filial system. 
For well over a thousand years, family dynamics and gender roles in society were well-defined, 
and these roles defined a person’s purpose and responsibilities from birth to the afterlife. 
Because of this, Chinese society and family dynamics have long been based on filial piety and 
patriarchal, patrilineal, patrilateral, and patrilocal practices.   
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For centuries “in practice the Chinese legal system was ‘Confucianized legalism’ that 
intertwined legal codes with moral principles.” (Y. Peng 778). The norms and values of 
Confucian morality and structure were absorbed by and reflected in Chinese society. The central 
focus of Confucianism is its emphasis on filial piety. Confucian social order is based on the Five 
Relationships: ruler to subject, parent to child, husband to wife, elder brother to younger brother, 
and friend to friend. Within the family, the father is supreme just like the ruler is supreme on a 
national level and children revere their parents like subjects revere the ruler. According to 
Confucian teachings, a stable society begins with a stable household and society is modeled on 
the power dynamic in the family unit.  
Because of its focus on male-dominance, having sons was crucial in Confucian traditions. 
“According to Confucianism, the worst among three grace failures in filial responsibility is to 
fail to have a son”, and, thus, traditionally the ideal Chinese family was composed of “as many 
generations of the male line and as many males as possible” (Settles, et al. 11). Mencian 
Confucianism declared the primary moral obligation of a son to his parents was to have a son of 
his own to continue the family line, and childbearing and childrearing were the foremost moral 
responsibilities of a woman (Mann 187). Men’s roles were defined by the Five Relationships, but 
women’s roles were clarified by the Three Obediences. These stipulate that a woman must “obey 
her father before marriage, her husband when married, and her son when widowed.” (Judd 166). 
In this structure women have essentially no connection to the world except through a related 
male creating a patrilateral dynamic (166).  
Since daughters were to leave the natal family and become a part of their marital family, 
sons were depended upon for the well-being of the family. Sons were not only family laborers, 
but they also cared for and supported their aging parents. In traditional Chinese culture, having a 
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son was essential to support the family, continue the family line, care for elderly parents, and 
tend to the needs and desires of ancestors (Li and Cooney 277-278). For parents, having a son 
was critical both during their lives and after their deaths for ancestral worship. Because 
daughters were considered temporary members of their natal family who would not contribute to 
the family lineage or resources, they were devalued in the patrilineal system (Deutsch 368). In 
this system, sons were given the attention and resources of their parents since it was they who 
would support their aging parents and continue the family line.  
Despite extreme religious oppression during the Cultural Revolution, the concept of a 
filial, patriarchal society was ingrained in Chinese culture and survived the Maoist era (Deutsch 
368). Popular sayings such as zhongnan qingnu 重男轻女, which means “value sons, disregard 
daughters”, still permeated society and sons were valued to better the family’s circumstances, 
carry on the family lineage, and care for the parents in their old age. However, the 
implementation of the OCP has dramatically altered traditional family structure in China. It is 
important to note before I address daughters specifically, that the OCP has caused a breakdown 
of traditional Confucian family dynamics.   
Families with only one child are popularly referred to as “4-2-1” families. In this 
structure, there are four grandparents, two parents, and one child and this is now the predominant 
form of family in China. Many families that fit this model appear to be centered on the singleton 
child, which directly conflicts with the Confucian ideal of the family being centered on the father. 
“These children became the objects of the intense attention and doting of two sets of 
grandparents, who often responded to their beck and call, acting as their “servants”.” (Goossaert 
and Palmer 238). This – on its face – is a complete inversion of the dynamic prescribed by filial 
piety. Traditionally, even parents mourning the death of a child was considered a break in this 
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structure because convention barred seniors from mourning their juniors (238). Because of the 
emphasis the OCP has placed on the sole offspring, children who would be considered the lowest 
members of societal hierarchy are now the “little emperors” of their families. And, this 
phenomenon is affecting both sons and daughters in single child families.  
Although the family dynamic has shifted in single child families, filial practices are still 
prominent even with the OCP in place. A study of senior undergraduates in 2006 indicated that 
the young people still demonstrated a large level of filial piety. Although massive resources were 
being invested in the children, they still had concern for their parents’ welfare, included their 
parents’ wishes in their future plans, desired to produce grandchildren to fulfill their filial 
obligation, and intended to support their parents in their old age (Deutsch 382). The same study 
found that the child-centered family dynamic may result in closer emotional ties between the 
child and the parent and singleton children felt more responsible for their parents’ emotional 
well-being and were more likely than children with siblings to plan to live in the same cities as 
their parents. Singleton children seemed to feel stronger filial obligations to their parents since 
there were no siblings with which to share the duties (382). It is critical to note that this held true 
for both single sons and single daughters, which is a break from patriarchal practice since 
traditionally daughters did not have obligations to their own parents. 
The OCP directly clashes with patriarchal family structures because families often do not 
have the option of having a son. However, since the success of one generation in China is viewed 
as the achievements of the next and children are relied upon to care for their parents in old age, 
Chinese parents do not simply give up hope after having a daughter. Increasingly, the success of 
singleton daughters is being strongly invested in by their parents and are being afforded interest 
and opportunities that they may not have had if they were competing with brothers for the 
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attention and resources of their parents. The 4-2-1 family structure funnels financial and other 
support all towards the single child, regardless of gender. “Girls born after China’s one-child 
policy… have more power to challenge detrimental gender norms than ever before, thanks to the 
decline of patriliny and the absence of brothers for their parents to favor.” (Fong 1098). It has 
been seen that “Parents whose love, hope, and need for old-age support are all pinned on just one 
child tend to do whatever is necessary to make that child happy and successful, regardless of the 
child’s gender.” (1102).  
Furthermore, parents are realizing that to be cared for when they are elderly, they must 
assist their daughters in becoming economically beneficial. Since the policy went into effect and 
was implemented between 1979 and 1982, the first generation of singleton daughters is between 
the ages of 32 and 35. Except for government and large company employees, China’s lack of 
comprehensive pensions means that almost 70 percent of all elderly people depend on financial 
help from their children (Settles, et al. 13). The traditionally son-oriented task of caring for aging 
parents has fallen on these singleton daughters. The idea that daughters could not support their 
elderly parents has been a significant obstacle to equality between sons and daughters, and 
parents would avoid investing family resources in their daughters because of this (Fong 1101). 
This generation of daughters who were economically enabled by their parents are beginning to 
prove that daughters are able to provide their aging parents with financial support, and have thus, 
proved that daughters can be as filial as sons (1101). This has both alleviated some of the 
pressure to have sons and shown that daughters, when afforded the opportunity, can be just as 
beneficial to the family. The traditional way of viewing daughters only as future wives to be 
given to another family through marriage has changed. Daughters are increasingly being seen as 
valuable assets to their natal families. Since parents can have only one child, when that child is a 
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daughter the parents must depend on their daughter for affective ties and their future economic 
welfare. This altered family dynamic increases the value of the singleton daughters to their 
parents and, in turn, increases the parents’ investments in their daughters (Deutsch 370). This 
demonstrates a destruction of patriarchal norms.  
As discussed, the first generation of singleton daughters has reached their mid-thirties. 
This means that daughters who were only children are now having single daughters of their own. 
The impact of the OCP on gender preference and preference in number of children has been 
drastic. A study published in 2004 revealed that in Shanghai only about half of individuals aged 
20-30 years old desired to have even two children, and the mean number of children desired was 
1.46. Additionally, the same study reported that more than 75 percent of respondents said that it 
does not matter about having a son or a daughter (Settles, et al. 11). Son preference has long 
reflected the gender inequality in China (Deutsch 379). “This shift towards accepting a norm of 
one or two children, and having less of a gender preference is a major difference from Confucian 
ideology.” (Settles, et al. 11). This shift is not isolated to large urban areas. Research has found 
that rural areas have also seen a shift in preferences. In the early 1990s, a survey of a hundred 
households in the Guanzhong prefecture of the Shaanxi province, found that the most popular 
number of children desired was two with one daughter and one son. When asked about 
investment in children’s education and career aspirations, the difference in responses regarding 
boys and girls was not very large (Gilmartin, Rofel, and White 89). 
The 2006 study of undergraduates also found that only children had more gender 
equitable preferences for their future offspring. Of all students asked, the majority (60 percent) 
had no sex preference, and of those who indicated a preference, over one-fourth (28 percent) 
would prefer to have a daughter. Of this, the only children respondents came closest to parity. 
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Again, a majority (63 percent) had no sex preference, but of those who did express a sex 
preference almost half (43 percent) preferred to have daughters (Deutsch 379). Another study, 
conducted in 2001, data was collected regarding total of 35,585 women ranging in age from 15-
49 years from 346 cities and 1041 villages found that over a third (37 percent) of respondents 
had no sex preferences for their offspring (Ding and Hesketh 372). Of the women who expressed 
gender preferences, the women were given the scenario of having two children. Responding to 
this, 72 percent expressed the desire to have both a girl and a boy while 10 percent expressed the 
desire to have two girls (372). Also, young women under the age of twenty-five – especially in 
urban areas – were more likely to express the desire to have daughters (373). This demonstrates 
an enormous break in the traditional preference of sons and the view that having daughters is a 
disappointing outcome.  
Ultimately, the OCP does not appear to be undermining filial piety, but does seem to be 
undermining patrilineal practices (Deutsch 381). This dynamic has been critical for the positive 
impact the OCP has had on gender equality. Since filial practices have remained intact, there is 
still a necessity for the offspring to carry on the family lineage, bring resources and success to 
the family, and care for their aging parents. These obligations and expectations make ensuring 
the development of the child into a family asset critical. When a son is not present to carry out 
these duties, the duties are being transferred to the singleton daughter, and with that comes the 
support, attention, and investment of the family in the daughter’s success. The OCP has caused 
the traditional practices of filial piety to come in conflict with traditional patriarchal, patrilineal, 
patrilateral and patrilocal practices. Although these practices were historically complementary to 
each other, the OCP’s restructuring of the Chinese family has caused a shift in their relationship 
and filial practices have overcome patriarchal practices to the benefit of singleton daughters.  
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The OCP has empowered singleton daughters that no longer have to compete with 
siblings, particularly brothers, for the support, attention, and investment of their parents. The 
focus of the parents on success of their daughter has led to enormous gains in gender equality in 
China. The new role of the daughter in China as an empowered, important part of the family has 
provided daughters with opportunities that they previously had not had access to. 
 
Education and Gender Equality 
Education is viewed in Confucianism as the primary way to achieve a better self and to improve 
society (Wang 34). As such, education is highly valued in Chinese culture, but it has in the past 
been seen as a male undertaking. As demonstrated in the changing role of the daughter in the 
Chinese family, singleton daughters are receiving unprecedented family support, attention and 
investment. Not only do singleton daughters receive undivided resources from their families, but 
they also do not have to compete for and share with siblings – especially brothers – the resources. 
Traditionally, adult sons and adult daughters were to serve different roles. Sons were expected to 
perform the filial duties discussed in the previous section such as caring for parents in their old 
age. As such, education for sons was critical to for the benefit of the entire family. Conversely, 
since daughters were to be given to another family to procreate, formal education for daughters 
was dispensable and daughters were more commonly taught to cook and clean in order to care 
for their martial families (Wang 26). It was common for daughters to drop out of school to allow 
family resources to instead pay for the education of a son or for elder sisters to leave school and 
begin working to support the education of their younger brothers. This sacrifice was encouraged 
and highly praised (11). The depravation of the daughter’s education to support the son’s aligned 
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with Confucian patriarchal principles, but with only a single child in the family, singleton 
daughters do not face this challenge and instead are viewed as valuable assets to the family. The 
support of the singleton daughter’s education is critical to her ability to support her aging parents 
and to better the family’s standing.   
Since education and literacy have been rising for both genders since the mid-twentieth 
century in China, a simple analysis of the rise of literacy and levels of education for females is 
not sufficient to demonstrate the benefit of the OCP for singleton daughters. I will instead use 
studies that focus on educational achievement among singleton daughters in comparison to 
singleton sons and daughters from multi-sibling families. Numerous studies have occurred that 
focused on documentation of a single city, single school, or single region in China. 
Overwhelmingly, this research has shown that singleton daughters not only enjoy more 
investment in their education than daughters in multi-child families, but also that singleton 
daughters often receive more investment of family resources in their education than singleton 
sons do. A 1996 study that used survey data from four Chinese provinces found that the parents 
of singleton daughters invested more in the education of their daughters than the parents of 
singleton sons (Bian). A 2002 study of 1,040 singleton daughters and sons in Wuhan, China 
found no difference in the parental expenditures and expectations in their single children based 
on gender (Tsui and Rich). And, a 2003 study of 220 children aged 14-19 in Yangzhou, China 
found that parents invested equally in their child’s education regardless of gender (Veeck, Flurry, 
and Jiang).  
In 2011, Dr. Ming-Hsuan Lee of the National Sun Yat-sen University in Taiwan 
published the first nation-wide study of the OCP and gender equality in education in China. Dr. 
Lee used individual-level data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) from 1989, 
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1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, and 2006. The CHNS is a collaborative project between the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill’s Carolina Population Center and the National 
Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety at the Chinese Center for Disease and Control Prevention. 
The CHNS uses a random cluster process to create a sample size of 4,400 households with a 
collective total of 16,000 individuals across nine provinces in China that vary substantially in 
both their geography and economic development (Lee 44). Table 1 is a representation of the 
findings of this research with regards to the schooling of girls.  
 
Table 1 Determinants of years of schooling by gender and by rural and urban area in China (OLS)  
Dependent variable: years of schooling 
 Urban   Rural   
 Girls (1) Boys(2) All (3) Girls (4) Boys (5) All(6) 
Onlychild 0.329 
(0.155) 
0.141 
(0.386) 
0.219 
(0.249) 
0.861* 
(0.427) 
0.465* 
(0.181) 
0.574** 
(0.240) 
Female   0.055 
(0.130) 
  - 0.189▫ 
(0.063) 
Fatheredu 0.103▫ 
(0.062) 
0.035 
(0.096) 
0.045 
(0.042) 
0.157** 
(0.047) 
0.129** 
(0.036) 
0.139** 
(0.029) 
Motheredu 0.082 
(0.061) 
0.008 
(0.086) 
0.088 
(0.041) 
0.136** 
(0.036) 
0.016 
(0.032) 
0.070** 
(0.024) 
Hhinc 0.667** 
(0.151) 
0.321** 
(0.113) 
0.853** 
(0.172) 
0.187 
(0.162) 
0.087 
(0.243) 
0.056 
(0.208) 
income_comm 0.213▫ 
(0.101) 
0.075** 
(0.015) 
0.092** 
(0.018) 
0.558▫ 
(0.242) 
0.408** 
(0.131) 
0.535 
(0.982) 
Farminghh    - 0.069* 
(0.026) 
- 0.056* 
(0.020) 
- 0.062** 
(0.023) 
nonfarm_comm    0.618** 
(0.148) 
0.119* 
(0.053) 
0.497 
(0.398) 
Constant 9.601** 
(0.607) 
10.795** 
(0.932) 
9.928** 
(0.435) 
7.642** 
(0.731) 
9.436** 
(0.622) 
8.637** 
(0.527) 
R2 0.163 0.310 0.169 0.239 0.124 0.154 
obs  141 147 288 517 564 1,081 
Note all regressions include community and birth year fixed effects 
Statistical significance level ▫P\0.1, *P\0.05, **P\0.01 
(Lee 47, slightly modified)1 
Table 1 demonstrates that the coefficients on Onlychild is all positive in all the models 
(and statistically significant in the rural models), which shows that only children had more years 
of schooling than children in multi-sibling families. The result is not surprising. Parents of single 
children can invest more fully in the educational development of the child since the resources of 
                                                          
1
 For explanation of the controls used and regression analysis performed, see “The One-Child Policy and Gender 
Equality in Education in China: Evidence from Household Data” by Dr. Ming-Hsuan Lee 
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the family need not be divided amongst multiple siblings. However, these differences affected 
singleton daughters more than singleton sons. Being a singleton daughter in an urban area 
increased the years of schooling by 0.33 when comparing the singleton daughter to girls who had 
siblings, while singleton sons’ average years of schooling increased by only 0.14 when compared 
to boys who had siblings. Likewise, when examining rural areas, singleton daughters enjoyed 
0.86 additional years of schooling over daughters in multi-child families, while singleton sons’ 
received an increase of 0.47 years over their counterparts in multi-child families (Lee 46). This 
indicates that singleton daughters not only received additional educational opportunities than 
daughters with siblings, but also that the opportunities for education for singleton daughters 
improved more drastically than for singleton sons. This may be because parents are more likely 
to invest in the education of a son regardless of additional children. Overall, the singleton status 
is beneficial to both genders, but singleton daughters receive comparatively more educational 
benefits from their singleton status.  
The results of this regression regarding the control variables also revealed interesting 
findings. The educational attainment of the father had a positive impact on the years of schooling 
for the child regardless of gender, and the impact was larger for daughters than sons in both 
urban and rural areas. However, the educational attainment of the mother had little effect on the 
years of schooling of the son, but had a positive effect on the years of schooling for the daughter 
(Lee 47). As the first generation of singleton daughters who benefitted from increased education 
is now having single daughters of their own, we can expect the mothers to pass on this benefit to 
their daughters, further increasing gender equality in education. 
The table indicates that a gender bias in education still exists in multi-child families, but 
that this bias is overcome when there is a single child. Singleton daughters receive more 
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schooling than daughters who must compete with siblings for family resources, and singleton 
daughter receive equal – and sometimes greater – educational opportunities than singleton sons. 
The single-child status of daughters under the OCP has made a positive impact on the equity of 
education in China based on gender.   
 
Labor and Gender Equality 
Since its rise to power in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party touted its support for equal 
opportunity and support for women in the workforce. A great deal of legislation was created 
based on the principle that men and women should have equal right to paid work and be treated 
equally in the labor market. However, the actual enforcement and application of legislation for a 
gender equal labor market has been markedly weak.  
Despite obstacles, China boasts one of the highest levels of female labor force 
participation in the world and one of the smallest gender wage gaps in urban areas among 
developing countries. The post-Cultural Revolution labor force participation rates of women 
were high, but women were often shunted into lower-skilled jobs than men and thus, jobs with 
lower pay. This laid the foundation for disadvantaging women by segregating them into the 
bottom end of the labor force (5-6). While women do have high participation rates and there is a 
closing wage gap among like jobs, women still represent a higher proportion of lower-wage 
employment.  China’s labor market is fair from gender equal, but the OCP has greatly aided 
Chinese women in closing the gap in the gender stratified labor market. 
Since female labor force participation rates have been high and rising since the Cultural 
Revolution, I will frame my argument similarly to what I used in my section on education. 
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Instead of focusing on increasing participation, wage gaps, and so forth, I will use a comparison 
of singleton daughters to singleton sons and daughters in multi-sibling families.  
In rural areas, there are less varied opportunities for employment for both genders with 
agriculture being the dominating sector. The OCP has been relaxed for farming families due to 
the demand for labor and in many areas if the family’s first child is a girl, they may have one 
more with varied rules as to how long the wait must be. However, if the first child is a boy, they 
may not reproduce again. Even with this exception, there are still large numbers of singleton 
daughters in rural areas. While precise data is difficult to collect from rural areas, there has been 
a noted increase in women’s empowerment in agriculture. Without sons to inherit the property, 
singleton daughters are more often inheriting the family’s land, which makes them greater 
economic stakeholders. This is a direct break in patrilocal practices. Women have also been seen 
in increasing numbers to be running farms largely unassisted by men (9).  
The study performed by Dr. Ming-Hsuan Lee also included a chart on education using 
the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) from 1997, 2000, 2004, and 2006 to show the 
impact of siblings on income, employment, and career types. Table 2 is a summary of her 
findings. 
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Table 2 Comparison of only children and children with siblings  
 
                                                                         Children with Sibling(s)             Only Children 
     
  All Girls Boys  
Average years of schooling (years) 9.4 10.8 11.1 10.7 
Annual income (yuan)* 6,748 8,402 9,505 7,781 
Occupation*     
Professional/technical worker  
   (doctor, professor, lawyer, architect, engineer, midwife, 
nurse, teacher, editor, photographer 
3.3% 9.27% 14.0% 6.6% 
Governmental sector 0.8% 1.22% 1.8% 0.9% 
Office Staff 
   (secretary, office helper)  
3.5% 13.04% 21.1% 8.5% 
Farmer, fisherman, hunter 44.4% 15.19% 7.0% 19.8% 
Skilled worker 
   (foreman, group leader, craftsman) 
6.6% 7.87% 0.0% 12.3% 
Non-skilled worker 
   (ordinary laborer, logger)  
19.0% 17.30% 22.8% 14.2% 
Army/police 2.1% 4.22% 0.0% 6.6% 
Driver 3.8% 6.01% 0.0% 9.4% 
Service Worker 
   (housekeeper, cook, waiter, doorkeeper, hairdresser, 
counter, counter salesperson, launderer, child care worker) 
16.4% 22.26% 31.6% 17.0% 
Athlete, actor, musician  0.2% 3.66% 1.8% 4.7% 
Sample size 1,047 322 116 206 
* The information is drawn from the latest survey wave 2006 or 2004 
Source 1997, 2000, 2004, and 2006 CHNS 
(Lee 45, slightly modified)2 
Table 2 shows females who were raised as singletons have a significantly higher income 
than the average for children with siblings. Interestingly, singleton daughters average nearly two 
thousand more yuan of income per year than singleton sons. From this, we can see that being a 
singleton daughter greatly affects the earning power of the woman.  Also significant, singleton 
daughters are almost twice as likely to be professional/technical workers than singleton sons and 
are more than four times more likely than children with siblings are. The latter can be explained 
by the additional education, resources, and support given to single children, but the former is 
surprising. This may be related to the fact that singleton daughters are also receiving, on average, 
more education than singleton sons. Another possible explanation is that some gender norms 
related to employment are still prevalent. For instance, a singleton son may leave school earlier 
because he is able to take a mid-wage job as a skilled worker, such as a foreman, but these jobs 
                                                          
2
 For explanation of the creation of Table 2, see “The One-Child Policy and Gender Equality in Education in China: 
Evidence from Household Data” by Dr. Ming-Hsuan Lee 
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are not generally seen as fit for women, so a singleton daughter may stay in school longer in 
hopes of taking a more gender-fitting job, such as being midwife or nurse, which happens to be 
high-wage employment. If this is occurring, the gender-based stereotypes of certain fields of 
works may actually be working in the favor singleton daughters as it encourages them to 
continue their education and enter the workforce in higher waged and skilled positions.  
Because female labor force participation has primarily been in the lower-skilled and 
lower-wage employment, the dramatic increase in the likelihood of women being professional or 
technical workers when they have been raised as singleton daughters is astounding. Also 
surprising is that singleton daughters are twice as likely as singleton sons to be employed in the 
governmental sector. This implies that singleton daughters’ employment is also granting them an 
increased voice within the government. It can be seen that singleton daughters not only have 
more education, higher salaries, and more representation in government work than children 
raised in multi-sibling families, but also singleton sons.  
Research has additionally shown that young adult women in China are feeling 
increasingly empowered since the implementation of the OCP. They are more likely to enter the 
labor force to provide financial support for their parents, which reduces the significance of 
patrilineal linage, which, in turn, creates further female empowerment. This results in greater 
gender equality in China and a cyclical cycle of empowerment that is beginning to emerge 
(Wang 14). Preliminary research has also shown that since women can only have a single child, 
they are remaining in the workforce longer prior to having a child. Trends also indicate that 
mothers of singletons are returning to the workforce after having a child since they will not be 
having more children and the singleton will be in compulsory education within a few years, so 
child-rearing need not be the sole occupation of the mother.  
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The OCP clearly assists in lessening the gender stratification of the labor force in China. 
Singleton daughters not only enter the labor force in larger proportions, but they have higher-
skilled and higher-waged occupations than both non-singletons and singleton sons.    
 
Marriage Dynamics and Gender Equality 
Another major factor to be considered in gender equality is marriage dynamics. Traditionally, 
females in China have not only been subordinate to men during marriage but have also had little 
input in choosing their spouse. The OCP is changing this patrilateral dynamic. Increasingly, 
women are gaining power in choosing spouses and within marriage and family.  
As discussed in the section on family structure, women have traditionally had little power 
within the family. The father reigned supreme within the family unit, and in accordance with the 
Three Obediences of Mencian Confucianism, the woman must “obey her father before marriage, 
her husband when married, and her son when widowed.” (Judd 166). Women had very little 
input in deciding when or to whom they would be wed, and after marriage, they were to obey 
their husbands and produce children.  
When researching the OCP, one often finds the shocking statistics on son preference in 
infants. This has led to gender-selective abortions, female abandonment, and female infanticide. 
These atrocious human rights issues have actually led to some surprising results when one 
considers all related gender equality measures. A normal sex ratio balance (SRB) is around 110 
males to every 100 females at conception and around 105 males to every 100 females at birth 
(Poston). The chart below shows the SRB from China and from the United States over the last 
three decades. 
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Chart 2  
 
(Poston, modified)  
As seen in the chart, the United States’s SRB follows the normal rate, while China’s SRB 
is strongly out of proportion with, at its highest, over 120 males born to every 100 females. This 
has resulted in over 40 million “extra” Chinese males born between the years of 1983 and 2010 
(Poston). This surplus of males is coupled with a roughly proportionate 30-40 million females 
missing (Zaidi 153). Collectively, this forms an enormous imbalance in the supply and demand 
for wives with three men to every two eligible women in many areas (Settles, et al. 10). With 
high supplies of males seeking a wife among a scarce supply of females, the power in selectivity 
of spouses is increasingly being transferred to the women. For example, a few decades ago in 
Beijing, parents would submit their daughters’ information to a matchmaker and bachelors and 
their parents would select eligible candidates. Now, at Jade Lake Park in Beijing bachelors 
prepare resumes and post them on a wall. Single women stroll by looking at the submissions and 
taking notes on which bachelors they wish to contact (Poston). Furthermore, singleton daughters 
who are well-educated and economically stable are able to be more selective in their spousal 
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choice, are in no need of quickly finding a spouse for economic stability, and may not find 
having an early marriage or any marriage at all to be attractive (Settles, et al. 23).  
Within the marriage, spousal dynamics are becoming increasingly equal. Since the 
marriage age is rising, especially in urban areas, singleton daughters have become educated and 
spent many years supporting themselves in the labor force independently of their natal family or 
a husband. This makes the wives less likely to be subordinate to their new husbands since they 
have spent almost a decade forging their own paths. The mandate of only having a single child 
also shortens the period of time when child care and related housework is necessary, which 
allows more options and opportunities to negotiate or renegotiate household tasks and gender 
roles with the relationship (Settles, et al. 23). A study in Dalian, a large city in Liaoning Province 
in northeastern China, performed in 2002 found that while wives were more likely to do 
household chores than husbands, but husbands were far more likely to help with household 
chores than the older generation of men whom responded that they did no housework at all (Fong 
1105). The same study also found that in families where the wife’s income is higher than the 
husband’s, the husband did even more housework than the wife. The study noted that in one 
family, the husband worked a factory job while the wife rented a fruit stand and sold fruit from 
8:30am to 7:30pm. Despite both being employed, the wife did all of the housework. However, 
when the husband was laid off from his factory job, the husband took on the majority of the 
housework, including having dinner ready every night when his wife came home from work. 
Also, the study found that both singleton sons and singleton daughters expect a more egalitarian 
division of responsibilities and labor than their parents have. Some young men even indicated 
that they planned on doing more housework than their wives in order to “win and keep” a wife in 
the tight marriage market (1105).  
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As demonstrated in the labor section, singleton daughters actually have a higher average 
income than singleton males and males with siblings. Thus, women are coming into relationships 
often with a higher income than their spouses. This alters the traditional dynamic of the wife 
being fully reliant on the husband, and, in some instances, the roles are reversed and the 
husbands are more reliant on the higher income of their wives. Traditionally, even women who 
worked prior to marriage would give up their employment after marrying to take on the 
responsibilities of full-time child-rearing and housework. But, due to only being allowed to have 
one child, women are returning to the workforce after having their single child, and are thus able 
to invest in their careers and continue to improve their status and power within the family (Wang 
23).  
Women have also gained more equality in terminating a marriage when they desire to. 
Before the implementation of the One Child Policy in 1979, divorce rates were below 5 percent 
in China, but this has increased to over 15 percent in 2001 (Settles, et al. 10).Traditionally, even 
widows who remarried were publically scorned for having broken their filial bonds to their late 
husbands and his family, and the government regularly honored young widows who remained 
chaste until death with monuments (Mann 14). Now, women can both file for divorce and 
remarry as desired. It is argued that the increasing independence of women brought on by the 
policy as well as having only one child has reprioritized the traditional bonds of marriage. Since 
they only have one child, young couples are able to spend more time and energy individually 
pursuing careers and avocations, which may lead to couples feeling freer to part ways because 
they have separate interests and can support themselves (Settles, et al. 10). Though rising divorce 
rates may be considered a negative outcome, the independence of spouses pursuing individual 
interests as well as collective interests indicates rising equality in the marriage dynamic. Women 
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may also feel freer to initiate a divorce when they want to because in most instances they are no 
longer fully reliant on their husbands’ income and have means by which to support themselves 
financially. The ability of both spouses to choose to terminate the marriage leads to more gender 
equality with the marriage since there is a more equal power dynamic.   
The OCP has altered marriage dynamics in China, making them more gender equal. The 
SRB imbalance, the educational and career attainment of singleton daughters prior to marriage, 
and the lack of necessity for one spouse to be involved in full-time child rearing has created a 
more equitable dynamic and empowered women both in selecting a spouse and within the 
marriage. 
 
Religion and Gender Equality 
Although China has a variety of religions that exist in different areas of the country, ancestor 
worship is a religious practice that permeates most regions and religious traditions in China. 
“Ancestor worship and bloodline continuation are the core norms of lineage in China.” (Y. Peng 
770). Intersecting with Confucian tradition, ancestor worship is also highly patriarchal, 
patrilineal, patrilateral, and patrilocal. Traditional ancestor worship practices involve sons 
honoring their natal family’s ancestors while daughters worship their spouses’ natal ancestors. 
Ancestor worship is “the Chinese cultural construction through which descendants are united by 
a common goal and shielded from misfortunes by ancestral spirit” (770). Sons are obligated by 
filial piety to worship their ancestors and maintain any associated tomb, altars, or tablets, and 
failing to do so could result in punishments like illness for neglecting them (Wolf 160). 
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Traditionally, all women were ritual members of their marital family and had no place in 
the ritual worship of her natal ancestors. This went so far as to dictate that when a woman died, 
her ritual place was in the genealogy and at the ancestral altar of her husband (Mann 10). This 
was so enforced that in death, the soul of an unmarried daughter would not be seated in her natal 
alter because, as a San-hsia villager in 1973 stated, “They are supposed to die in other people’s 
houses.” (Wolf 149). Essentially, daughters had no place in the ritual lineage of their birth 
families and only sons could continue the necessary worship of the ancestors of the natal family. 
A woman was not considered a full member of her husband’s family until she was able to prove 
her worth to the lineage by producing a male heir to the bloodline (Shi 89). Without a son, not 
only did the bloodline die, but the worship of ancestors in that lineage ended as well. If a woman 
died without having born a son, she died not only lacking an ancestral claim to her natal family 
but also lacking full integration into her marital family’s lineage. Furthermore, if a wife were to 
attempt to bring her parents’ ancestral tablets with her at marriage, they were be relegated to an 
altar in a back room or a lower, subjugated altar, thus being neglected (Wolf 153). Thus, having 
at least one son was critical and the more sons produced, the more focus and reverence the 
ancestors of that lineage would have. 
During the Cultural Revolution, religion in China was brutally oppressed. For thirteen 
years, there was a total suppression of religion, which ended in December 1978 with the policy 
of freedom of religious belief being restored by the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress. 
The next fall, places of worship, such as mosques, churches, and temples, began to reopen, and 
in 1982 the National Constitution Revision Committee vice-chairman Peng Zhen stated that as 
long religions did not interfere with the state and remained supportive of patriotism, “Citizens 
enjoy freedom of religious belief. …citizens may believe in religion or disbelieve” (Macinnis 7). 
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Along with overcoming the challenges of reforming after prolonged government oppression, 
religious traditions and communities in China had to cope with changes in society brought about 
by other government policies. At the forefront of these challenges was the OCP, which was 
implemented in the years following the reinstatement of religious freedom.  
After the lessening of restrictions on folk religions, China has seen an enormous 
resurgence of ancestor worship. A survey in 2009 by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics 
confirmed this. The survey was of individuals fifteen years or older and persons of a variety 
statuses and backgrounds in China. 72.4 percent of those surveyed reported visiting ancestors’ 
graves in the previous twelve months. Seventeen percent believed in the power of ancestral 
spirits. In a 2007 survey, 17.5 percent identified as ancestor worshippers and 19.9 percent 
confirmed being adherents to a communal folk religion in which they worship a local deity, 
ancestral spirits, or both (Yang and Hu 514). The strong forms of ancestor worship and belief 
were unsurprisingly reported in higher percentages in rural and lower social class communities 
than in urban areas (516). 
Because it has only been 35 years since families have first been influenced by the strict 
OCP, it is yet unclear what the full impact of the One Child Policy will be on ancestor worship. 
In most families that have had only daughters, the father is still alive to worship his ancestors and 
the filial lineage has not ended yet. This prematurity makes it difficult to predict the exact 
impacts of the OCP on gender dynamics. But, there has been preliminary research that indicates 
that women are becoming increasingly involved in natal ancestor worship and possible shifts in 
how religious lineage is tracked.  
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The 2009 Chinese Bureau of Statistics survey mentioned above found that the primary 
practitioners of ancestor worship and folk religion were females (Yang and Hu 516). This is a 
major break in the traditionally male-dominated practices. Particularly, the shift to females being 
the primary practitioners of ancestor worship strongly indicates the increased value of the role of 
females in the family. It has also been observed that during the ancestral ritual practices of the 
traditional Grave-Sweeping Festival, “breaking with patrilineal tradition, women were more 
likely to worship their own parents rather than their husbands.” (Goossaert and Palmer 235). 
Women worshipping and honoring ancestors at the graves of their natal families instead of their 
martial families demonstrates not only that women are retaining their own familial identity in 
religion, but also that they are gaining power and status in religious practices. Being the primary 
carrier of the family’s spiritual well-being in the afterlife empowers those with that responsibility. 
And, preliminary reports show that daughters are increasingly being empowered in this manner, 
especially when sons are not present. 
When there is a singleton daughter, the family is given a choice: concede that the familial 
line is dead and cease the worship of generations of ancestors or transfer the religious duties that 
would usually fall upon the son to the singleton daughter. Although definite results are premature, 
it seems as though the latter is more likely to occur. When threatened by extinction, the 
definition of ancestral lineage is beginning to shift. Daughters are increasingly remaining 
religious members of their natal families and being empowered in the same way sons have 
traditionally been empowered. This follows a similar pattern to the increasing reliance on 
daughters for care of the aging parents. Now, daughters are caring for their parents in their old 
age and also caring for the spirits of their parents after their deaths. The shift in the definition of 
ancestral lineage also indicates that women do not have to rely on becoming married or have a 
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son to gain religious significance. Instead, she is religiously significant by her own existence. 
Passing religious responsibilities and duties down to the single child regardless of gender is 
empowering females and increasing gender equality in religion in China through ancestor 
worship. 
  
Conclusion 
The OCP has forced changes in the family structure in China that have empowered singleton 
daughters. The continued need for filial support has prompted parents to invest full family 
support and resources into their single child, regardless of gender. Without the competition for 
resources brought about by a brother or multiple siblings, singleton daughters have reaped the 
benefits of the undivided resources and support. As I have shown, singleton daughters receive 
more education than singleton sons and children from multi-sibling households. The channeling 
of familial resources and support to the singleton daughter alters patrilineal practices and shifts 
towards bilineal equality. With the first generation of singleton daughters now in the labor force, 
we have seen not only that their average annual income is higher than singleton sons and 
children from multi-sibling households but also that singleton daughters are far more likely to be 
employed in professional or technical careers and in government work. Empowered by education 
and stable income, these women are entering into more gender equal marriages and, because of 
an imbalanced SRB, they are often the party with more spouse-selecting power. Low fertility 
rates have allowed women to wait longer before marrying, helping them develop self-reliant 
tendencies, and remain in the workforce after marriage, which prevents forced full reliance on 
the husband. With both spouses earning incomes, participating in housework, and having the 
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ability to make decisions in the relationship, the marriage dynamic is quickly shifting from a 
patrilateral dynamic to a bilateral dynamic. With only a single child to support the parents and 
carry out other familial duties, singleton daughters are remaining attached to their natal families. 
Women are increasingly reported to be caring for their own aging parents and worshipping the 
ancestors of their natal families. This is a clear move away from patrilocal practices and towards 
neolocal practices.  
The shifts from patrilineal, patrilateral, and patrilocal practices to bilineal, bilateral, and 
neolocal practices show a deconstruction of the patriarchal system and rising gender equality in 
China. These shifts can be traced directly back to the changes the OCP caused in traditional 
Chinese family structure. With the first generation of empowered singleton daughters now 
having single children of their own, we can expect gender equality in China to continue to rise. 
Not only will the next generation of daughters in China benefit in the same way their mothers 
have from family resources and support, but also China’s next generation of daughters will be 
raised by parents in a more equal marriage dynamic and have successful, educated, empowered 
women to emulate. Also, the first generation of singleton sons who were raised in a more gender-
balanced educational environment, have female peers who are often out performing them in the 
workforce, and are entering into more gender-equal marriages are now passing these experiences 
down to their children as well. We can expect China’s next generation of sons to be increasingly 
regularized to a more gender equal norm with parents in a bilateral marriage dynamic and 
successful, educated, and empowered role models of both genders. I predict that extreme 
patriarchy of previous generations will become more obsolete as those traditions are witnessed 
less and less by each additional generation.   
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Despite other problematic outcomes of the OCP, it has had a positive impact on gender 
equality in China. Women in China are more empowered and have more opportunities available 
to them because of the OCP than any previous generation. We will continue to see gender 
equality rise in China as the new gender dynamics continue to develop.    
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